

‘Turks’ in London: Shades of Invisibility and the Shifting Relevance of Policy in the Migration Process

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Abstract

This paper reports the results of a pilot study into 'Turkish' Migrants in London. Drawing on notions of 'superdiversity', 'invisibility' and 'nodal points' (where migrants' actions intersect with policy), the account first maps out the three main constituent groups under study: Turkish Cypriots, 'mainland' Turks, and Kurds from Turkey. The main analytical part of the paper consists of an examination of the migration process of the three groups to London, built around the experiences of a small sample of migrants and key informants, and broken up into a number of stages – pre-migration and departure, arrival and adaptation, and settlement and the future. Throughout the analysis and in the conclusion, emphasis is laid on the intersection of migrants' life-stages with the policy nodes, which are shown to have variable relevance for migrants' decision-making.

Introduction: super-diversity and nodal points

Steven Vertovec has recently opened a new strand in the debate on multicultural Britain and the politics of immigration and integration by invoking the notion of 'super-diversity' to describe a level of complexity in migration processes and plurality of migrant groups never previously experienced in Britain. According to Vertovec (2007: 1024) 'diversity in Britain is not what is used to be', especially in London where, in the words of Ken Livingstone, the city's populist former mayor, 'you see the world gathered in one city' (quoted in Freeland 2005). The 'world in one city' slogan also featured in the Greater London Authority's analysis of the results of the 2001 Census (GLA 2005) and in the successful London bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games.

What, exactly, has changed? Three things, according to Vertovec. First, Britain's ethnic-minority and immigrant-origin populations are no longer dominated, as once they were, by the large, well-organised and easily identifiable communities from the former

Germany and Greece; Ukrainians in Hungary, Italy and Poland; Moroccans in Belgium, France and Spain; Turks in the Netherlands and the UK; and Mexicans in California, Missouri and Canada. The MIGSYS Final Report consists of an integrated summary of all 13 mini-projects, including a brief synthesis of our research on 'Turks' in London (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007a: 50-3, 77-82). We use the vehicle of this Sussex Migration Working Paper to describe in more detail the field and documentary research carried out in London, the results of which were written up in two unpublished reports presented to MIGSYS workshops in Athens, 30 June–1 July 2006 and 22–24 February 2007 (Thomson 2006; Thomson 2007).

So much for the mechanisms of the project. We now elaborate the conceptual framework that guided the MIGSYS research. Here we can do no better than quote Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2007a: 3):

[The research] aims at providing a better understanding of the connection between immigrants' plans and strategies of mobility, adaptation and survival, on one hand, and receiving country policies, on the other (...). More specifically, whether and what role these policies play in migrants' decisions to migrate, and/or in their plans to stay, move on to a different country, return to their country of origin, and in their overall efforts to adapt to the host country environment.

Key to the MIGSYS analytical frame is the concept of 'nodal points'. These are 'moments when a migrants' decision and/or realisation of a migration project intersects with a specific policy' (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007a: 11). Five nodal points can be identified in the evolution of a migration process over time (Triandafyllidou 2005: 5; 2006: 18-20):

- – to leave or stay, or commute or seasonally migrate. Apart from the family/household dimension of the decision (how much freedom does the individual

have, what is the role of family networks in migration?), relevant policies would include encouragement or barriers to migrate from a sending state, legal recruitment and entry channels from the receiving state, and alternative channels such as smuggling or clandestine entry and 'overstaying'.

- – actualising the desire to move (or failure to do so). Relevant policies – encouragement or control – as above, plus the level of information available to the migrant at this time.

- – as a legal vs. undocumented migrant, or asylum-seeker, or tourist/student and overstaying. Relevant policies relate to housing, education and training, employment, health and welfare assistance.

- – working and living conditions, securing of migrant or refugee status. Policies here relate to the broad field of social integration, protection from discrimination, and other policies listed for 'arrival'.

- – to stay long-term or to return 'home'; or to migrate to another destination country; or to adapt to circulation and a transnational lifestyle. Policies again relate to integration and anti-racism, plus incentives to return etc.

We shall see later how these nodal points apply to the migrants we interviewed and to the wider migrant communities they are part of.

Methodology

Interviews with a small sample of migrants and key informants were carried out in Haringey and Hackney in November and December 2006, following the guidelines of the MIGSYS project outline (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007a). The interview structure followed the principle of the intersection of biographical and policy nodal points sketched above, together with a complementary set of standard questions normally asked to migrants and to people working with migrant organisations.

Three in-depth interviews were carried out with 'Turkish' migrants (the names are pseudonyms):

- Lale, a Turkish Cypriot woman in her 50s who came to the UK as a school-leaver teenager.
- Hulya, mid-20s, who immigrated from mainland Turkey five years ago; and
- Baran, aged 30, a Kurdish refugee from eastern Turkey who arrived in the UK in the late 1990s.

As for interviews with 'policy-makers', we decided against speaking with representatives of national or local statutory bodies because we felt that their responses would simply mirror official policy lines, whose views are readily available through official documents and websites etc. Instead, we chose to interview people working at the interface between policy implementation and the lives of our 'target' migrant populations. These key informants were also drawn from amongst the various Turkish 'sub-communities', although all of them had extensive knowledge and experience beyond their particular sub-groups.

Interviews were held in the language of choice of the interviewee – hence English, Turkish and Kurdish were used. The interviews were taped (with the informants' permission, of course), transcribed and translated where necessary. In this paper the authors also draw on their wider knowledge, both of this part of North London and of the communities studied. We acknowledge, however, that the small size of the sample renders this study more in the nature of a pilot investigation.

Straightaway we must also acknowledge here at the outset that the designation 'Turkish' (or 'Turks' etc.) is deeply problematic, especially for the Kurds from Turkey (who resist being called 'Turkish Kurds'), but also, to some extent, for Turkish Cypriots (who may identify with Cyprus not with Turkey). Within Turkey, Kurds have a marginal, persecuted status deriving from the failure of the Turkish state to recognise them – Article 13 of the

Turkish Constitution states that 'in Turkey, from the point of view of citizenship, everyone is a Turk without regard to race or religion'. As we will see later, this hegemonic categorisation travels with the migrants/refugees to the receiving countries, where, despite their persecuted status derived from their situation in Turkey being the of their acceptance as refugees and asylum-seekers, they continue to be classed as 'Turkish'. Meanwhile, it is also important to appreciate that the emergent political and social realities amongst Kurdish exile communities in Europe have created new Kurdish identities and spaces for collective action. In particular there is a paradigm shift from having an identity imposed from Turkey (or from Iran, Iraq or Syria, the other countries with Kurdish populations), to a 'dreamed, imagined and constructed Kurdish identity formed in Kurdistan and in Diaspora' (Keles 2007). Likewise, some Cypriots do not want to be subsumed under the label of 'Turks' as they do not see themselves as migrants from the 'baby homeland' (' , a Turkish term for Cyprus) but view Cyprus as an independent country. This discussion continues in Northern Cyprus in terms of the relations between native Cypriots and settlers from Turkey.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Immediately below we describe the London setting for the 'Turkish' population in the UK, drawing on various data sources to indicate the size and characteristics of its three main constituent groups – Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks, and Kurds from Turkey. Next, these three sub-communities are portrayed in more detail. We then explore the migration process of these three groups to London, disaggregated by several stages or nodal points: pre-migration and departure, post-migration and adaptation; and settlement or return. In conclusion we stress the provisional nature of our findings; the diversity of migrants' backgrounds and migration trajectories; and key policy issues relating to the groups of migrants studied.

Table 1 London residents by country of birth outside the UK, 2001

Rank	Country	Number
1	India	172,162
2	Ireland	157,285
3	Bangladesh	84,565
4	Jamaica	80,319
5	Nigeria	68,907
6	Pakistan	66,658
7	Kenya	66,311
8	Sri Lanka	49,932
9	Ghana	46,513
10	Cyprus	45,888
11	South Africa	45,506
12	USA	44,602
13	Australia	41,488
14	Germany	39,818
15	Turkey	39,128
16	Italy	38,694
17	France	38,130
18	Somalia	33,831
19	Uganda	32,082
20	New Zealand	27,494

: GLA (2005)

Table 1 shows that, within London, Turks have a similar position, 15th, with just over 39,000, based on birthplace alone. However, a very different weighting is indicated by Table 2 which gives the estimated number of at nearly 74,000, making Turkish the fifth most widely spoken language in London after English.⁴

These data give important insights into the position of 'Turks' and 'Turkish-speakers' within the kaleidoscope of multicultural or super-diverse London, but they also problematise the label 'Turkish'. In fact, three distinct groups need to be recognised:

(Turkish nationals and Turkish-speaking), (Turkish-

on the CTK communities are fewer and less in-depth than those on other nominally 'white' groups such as the Irish (Jackson 1963; Walter 2001), the Italians (Colpi 1993; Sponza 1988) or even the Maltese (Dench 1975).⁵ Enneli (2005) refer to 'Turks and Kurds' as a set of 'invisible' and 'disadvantaged' ethnic communities. According to Mehmet Ali (1985), the 'Turkish-speaking communities' in the UK are a 'silenced minority' due to the number of racial attacks on them which have gone largely unreported. Another factor contributing to their 'invisibility' is the perception that they are a highly self-sufficient group, for example because many find employment in the 'ethnic economy' in labour-market niches such as coffee-shops and kebab houses. Their strong kinship and social networks, however, disguise many social problems faced by these communities, a significant number of whose members live in some of the most deprived areas of London. CTK populations are disproportionately engaged in low-wage employment, whilst many of the youth leave education with few qualifications. Another concern is the poor level of English amongst many first-generation immigrants.

CTK communities: shades of invisibility and deprivation

In this section of the paper we describe the three groups that make up the CTK population in London. Using a combination of secondary sources and our own interviews with immigrant and key community members, we delve into some social, economic and political aspects of the three communities, concentrating on areas of disadvantage that they suffer.

The three groups – Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks, and Kurds from Turkey – arrived at different albeit overlapping times and for different sets of reasons.

The Turkish Cypriots were the first to immigrate. Although a trickle had arrived in the 1930s, the main influx took place in the 1950s and 1960s. The British influence (Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 until 1960, when the island acquired independence) made the UK the destination of choice. Arrivals peaked in 1960-61, years that coincided with the withdrawal of British troops and the loss of well-paid jobs tied to the British colonial presence, and preceded the implementation of the UK Immigration Act of 1962. Hence this was an economic migration, driven to some extent by poverty and the opportunity to 'make good money' in Britain (Ladbury 1977: 303); but also, especially after the increase in inter-communal tension between the numerically dominant Greek Cypriots and the progressively marginalised Turkish Cypriots after 1963, by political motives too. Postwar London, meanwhile, offered plentiful opportunities for workers in a range of industrial and service occupations, as well as for some small-scale entrepreneurs. As one of our interviewees revealed, the attraction of Britain was especially strong for those regaled with 'stories about how beautiful the country was, how democratic, and how lifestyle was good [with] opportunities for everyone' (Lale, female, mid-50s, immigrated aged 19, now works in the care sector).

The Turkish Cypriot migration, like the movements of Greek Cypriots to Britain which occurred alongside it (see Constantinides 1977), was mainly a family migration; the intention was to settle in the UK, but to retain a Turkish Cypriot identity and links to Cyprus (Ladbury 1977). According to Robins and Aksoy (2001: 690), Turkish Cypriots emphasised their affinity to the 'British way of life' as a pragmatic attempt to be accepted. They were assisted by earlier-settled Greek Cypriots in finding accommodation and employment – the latter predominantly in the textile and dressmaking industries and in hotels, restaurants and snack-bars in London.

⁵ The extent to which these various ethno-national groups (including CTK migrants) are, indeed, 'white' is, of course, an issue for debate, which will not be followed up here.

Soon, many Turkish Cypriots established their own business in these sectors.

An interesting subplot in the story of Turkish Cypriot migration concerns their bi-communal relations with Greek Cypriots. The two communities emigrated in roughly the same proportions as their demographic distribution in Cyprus, where Greek Cypriots outnumbered Turkish Cypriots by four to one. But, unlike the growing inter-communal tensions back in Cyprus, with a virtual civil war during the years 1963-64 and then a brutal partition of the island in 1974, it appears that relations between the two communities in Britain remained reasonably cordial. This was partly because of their mutual, but unequal, dependence (Turkish Cypriots being more reliant on Greek Cypriots than vice versa), and partly because much of the migration to Britain occurred during a period of more harmonious co-existence, before the violent clashes which started in 1963 (Ladbury 1977).⁶

Regarding Turkish Cypriot numbers in the UK, there are only indirect indications. UK census birth-place records do not distinguish Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Successive censuses point to stable numbers of Cypriot-born since the main influx during the 1950s and 1960s: there were 72,665 in 1971, rising somewhat to 84,327 in 1981 (probably due to some renewed emigration as a result of the partition and displacement of both populations in 1974), then falling slightly to 78,191 in 1991 and 77,156 in 2001. Constantinides (1977: 272) suggested that the 1971 figure should be doubled to 140,000 to account for the second generation born in Britain, whilst Ladbury (1977: 305) estimated the Turkish Cypriot community at approximately 40,000 in the mid-1970s. Writing a quarter of a century (and therefore almost a generation) later, Robins and Aksoy (2001: 689) give an

estimate of 100,000, and claim that this is more than the 80,000 Turkish Cypriots remaining in Cyprus, where they now live in the self-proclaimed (but not internationally recognised) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, along with large numbers of post-partition settlers from Turkey.⁷ More recently, Enneli (2005) quote an estimate of 120,000 Turkish Cypriots – Cyprus-born plus second and third generations – living in the UK.

The geographical distribution of Turkish Cypriots in London reflects, but is not identical to, the parallel Greek Cypriot migration, and has in turn influenced subsequent immigration of Turks and Kurds. According to Ladbury (1977: 306), Turkish Cypriots initially settled slightly to the east of the main areas of Greek Cypriot settlement, which were in Camden and Islington. Turkish Cypriots were also more likely than Greek Cypriots to locate south of the river. Like the Greek Cypriots, and reflecting a history of settlement which now dates back over fifty years and hence includes the progressive residential scattering of the second and third

⁷ According to a recent analysis by Hatay (2007), there is a 'war of numbers' over the population of Northern Cyprus, due largely to the disputed quantity of immigrant-settlers from Turkey. Provisional results of the 2006 census of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) give a population of 256,644 (the enumeration was 265,100, including visitors and tourists). Of the total, 178,031 were TRNC citizens, 70,525 were Turkish citizens, and 8,088 were other nationalities. Of the 178,031 TRNC citizens 147,405 were Cyprus-born, 27,333 were Turkish-born (indicating that TRNC citizenship has been given to substantial numbers of Turkish settlers), and 2,482 were UK-born (mainly second-generation 'returnees'). And of the 147,405 Cyprus-born TRNC citizens, 120,031 have both parents born in Cyprus, 16,824 have both parents born in Turkey (hence these are 'second-generation' Turks in the TRNC), and 10,361 have one parent born in Cyprus and one born in Turkey (reflecting the substantial amount of intermarriage that has taken place between 'native' Turkish Cypriots and settler Turks). From all this we can deduce that there are around 120,000 'pure' Turkish Cypriots in Northern Cyprus, roughly the same number as the latest estimate for the Turkish Cypriot community in the UK. The Robins-Aksoy figure of 80,000 reflects politically-motivated under-estimates from the Republic of Cyprus government (the only internationally recognised government for the island, but which only controls the southern 60 per cent of the territory, where the Greek Cypriots live), which has been concerned to portray the Turkish Cypriot population as 'shrinking' in the face of massive immigration from Turkey.

⁶ This is not the place for a detailed examination of the 'Cyprus problem': for an overview see King and Ladbury (1982). There was, however, a further pulse of emigration in the mid-1970s, following partition (Hatay 2007: Appendix 2).

generations, there has been a process of suburbanisation away from the inner-city districts, moving north along the Haringey axis to Enfield, and southward to Croydon (King and Bridal 1982 for Greek Cypriots). This outward diffusion of the Turkish Cypriots away from their initial core areas, which were never very dense or visible in the first place, makes them today an even more 'invisible' group in the ethnic social geography of London. Robins and Aksoy (2001) sensitively explore this invisibility in terms of Turkish Cypriots' suspension between three more dominant spheres of cultural identity: British society, within which they are now rather successfully integrated; Greek-dominated Cypriotness; and the (mainland) Turkish sphere which has both political resonance in terms of the 'Cyprus problem' and cultural importance in terms of the later waves of Turkish immigration into London. A further symbol of Turkish Cypriots' lack of visibility is the remarkable dearth of academic research on this group.

Following the Turkish Cypriots, Turks from the mainland were the second of the three groups to arrive. Like the other two groups, they are overwhelmingly concentrated in London. The 2001 Census recorded 54,000 Turkish-born but this figure is subject to two important caveats: it includes Turkish-born Kurds, and it excludes second-generation Turks.

The arrival patterns of the mainland Turks were quite different from the Turkish Cypriots who preceded them. The first Turks to arrive, in the early 1970s, were single men who were joined by their wives and children later in the decade. To some extent this model of migration replicated the much larger migration of Turkish (and Kurdish) 'guestworkers' to Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Austria in the 1960s and 1970s.⁸ Most of the young

men migrating to the UK in the 1970s came originally from rural areas, but had often migrated internally to one of Turkey's big cities prior to their international move (Mehmet Ali 2001). The military coup in Turkey in 1980 brought a second wave of Turkish migrants to the UK, this time largely made up of intellectuals, students, trade union activists and professionals, with mainly urban origins (Erdemir and Vasta 2007). Like Turkish Cypriots, Turks in the UK have been very little researched; the significance of this neglect is different between the two groups. For the Turkish Cypriots the lacuna is perhaps more acute because the UK is by far the major destination for this emigration – other, minor, destinations include Australia, Canada and Turkey. For Turks, there has been abundant research on their other European destinations, especially Germany and the Netherlands.

Some of our key informants spoke about the relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks during the 1970s. The former were quick to create small businesses, as noted above, and thus opened up employment opportunities for mainland Turks.

In 1971, because of the initiative of the Turkish Cypriot employers in London there was a special agreement between Turkey and England to bring tailors to work in

⁸ The Turkish communities in these categories count 1.8 million in Germany (2005), 352,000 in the Netherlands (2004), 174,000 in France (1999), 125,000 in Austria (2001) and 47,000 in Belgium (2002); data are from

Work permits had to be renewed every year; Turks became residents after five years' legal residence. Many still retain their Turkish nationality, mainly to protect their rights in Turkey, such as land ownership (Issa 2005: 8).

Another channel or nodal point for Turkish immigration arose out of the Ankara Agreement, signed in 1963 between Turkey and the EU, which facilitated the migration of Turkish entrepreneurs to Europe. After Britain's accession to the EU in 1973, some thousands of small businesses were set up by Turkish migrants, mainly as restaurant and café owners.

Migration from Turkey rose again at the end of the 1980s as the conflict between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish government displaced thousands of Kurdish people from eastern and south-eastern Turkey. Whilst a significant number came as students or under a business visa, many sought asylum in the UK, often having been forcibly removed from their villages in eastern Turkey and ending up as involuntary internal migrants in the country's big cities. The graph of asylum-seekers from Turkey (most of whom are likely to be Kurdish) peaked at 4,650 in 1989. The response from the UK government at the time, which believed that many of these asylum-seekers were really 'economic migrants', was to impose visa controls on all Turkish nationals coming to the UK. Asylum applications from Turkey fell to a fluctuating plateau of around 1,500-2,000 per year throughout the 1990s, but then rose to a new annual peak of around 4,000 in the early 2000s, since when there has been a rather rapid decline to below 1,000 by mid-decade (Griffiths 2002; Home Office 2006). Alongside the asylum route, other Kurds have arrived clandestinely or remained as 'overstayers'.

The progressive hardening of asylum rules over the past 15 years through increased use of detention, restricting rights of appeal, limiting access to welfare and removing rights to work has made life

difficult for the Kurds (and other asylum populations). Refugees' housing and welfare needs were taken up by voluntary organisations and the church (Wahlbeck 1999: 72-4, 156-9). Like the Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks before them, Kurdish refugees from Turkey built on already-existing networks of support to help them settle in the UK, although many found it difficult to find steady employment and save money. This was partly due to the less favourable economic conditions they faced in the early 1990s. In particular, the textile industry – a sector which, over previous decades, had provided employment for many in the Turkish-speaking communities – had significantly declined. Especially for Kurdish women, access to employment was made more difficult by their poor English language skills and lack of education and training. Unlike Turkish Cypriot women, they do not have a tradition of skilled dressmaking; neither do they have the opportunity to learn such skills through training at work since much of the labour in this field is carried out at home and paid on piece rates (Enneli 2002). Meanwhile for Kurdish men, employment in small retail and service outlets (coffee and kebab houses, hairdressers, florists etc.) has been subject to growing competition and tightening margins, with the effect that the work available is increasingly casual, low-paid and subject to long hours.

Three important, and related, issues pertinent to the Kurds from Turkey are their distinctive cultural identity within the CTK community, the question of their numbers, and their condition of political exile. We take each in turn.

Asylum statistics mask Kurdish origin, for Kurdish asylum-seekers are recorded as coming from Turkey (or Iraq, Iran etc.). The history of Kurdish flight to Europe tells us that Kurds formed the majority of applications from Turkey in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Kurds from Turkey are simply subsumed under the category of Turks, and then when in the UK as part of

Turkey... it is also hidden from the moment of arrival on foreign soil' (Laiser 1996: 127). As a staff member of a Kurdish-Turkish community centre⁹ based in North London told us:

Kurds are very different from Turkish culture, Turkish identity. Our language is different from the Turkish language. We are two different ethnicities. We are not the same ethnicity, nor is Turkish the nationality that covers everyone. I mean, back in Turkey, on the passport it's written Turkish citizenship but that doesn't mean you're Turkish – that's a big problem.

There remains a sense amongst the Kurdish population in the UK that their culture and language are very much undervalued. Authors have spoken of the 'Turkish-speaking population' as an 'invisible minority' (Enneli 2005), but the fact that Kurds are routinely registered as Turks with local authorities in the UK lends weight to the argument that they themselves represent a particularly neglected ethnic group. This is why their community organisations insist that using the term 'Turkish-speaking community' is not neutral: it implies that 'Turkish Kurds' somehow 'belong' to Turkey, and that their separate Kurdish identity does not merit recognition. Their claims as a people and nation are at times found to be at odds with anti-terrorist legislation in the UK and with the UK's position in favour of Turkey joining the EU.¹⁰

⁹ In practice, the centres which call themselves 'Turkish and Kurdish community centres' are either Turkish- or Kurdish-dominated, with a very small minority of Turkish Cypriots involved.

¹⁰ Since the enactment of the 2001 Terrorism Act in the

family members living abroad. This is less surprising when we consider that all three

country. Here is an extract from her interview:

My main reasons [for migrating to the UK] were that my family lives here and I also came to learn English. I wanted to learn English as I think [it] is the most important language in the world. Another reason was that I was aware that the UK has a very good education system; as I am [was] a teacher in Turkey, so I wanted to see for myself how they manage here... I also always followed the news when I was in Turkey about the English education system, so that's why I came to this country... My family has lived in this country for a long time.

By her own admission, Hulya was in a more privileged position than most other migrants as she could travel to Europe without a visa on a special 'green' passport.¹¹ This passport allows its holders to stay up to three months in a European country, and is issued to government officials and civil servants, including teachers, in recognition of their service to the Turkish state. The passports are also issued to their wives and children. Although Hulya would subsequently have to apply for a student visa to enable her to prolong her stay in the UK, the green passport allows its holders to gain first-hand experience of life in a European country of their choice.

This leads us to the case of Baran, a Kurdish refugee who fled to the UK in 1991, because of the conflict in the north of Iraq. Baran fled to the UK in 1991, because of the conflict in the north of Iraq. Baran fled to the UK in 1991, because of the conflict in the north of Iraq.

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of freedom. At least that's what I was told... I chose the UK to feel freer... But now I know that it cannot

different institutions, and how they work. I got this information from friends who arrived here before me. For example, how I can find a job, open a bank account...

Baran's account is a healthy antidote against claims that generous welfare provisions attract asylum-seekers, and that restricting rules on work and levels of financial support will deter applications for asylum. He also understood that life in

working and having an equal life. I actually found out that we were doing the same job in the factory, yet boys were getting £13 [a week] and I was getting £7.

Baran, too, underwent deskilling after his release from prison, negating his university

a common reaction amongst long-resident and second-generation Turkish Cypriots (Robins and Aksoy 2001). On her most recent visit to Cyprus, she found her old home in Larnaca, in southern or 'Greek' Cyprus, as well as the capital Nicosia, much changed to the extent that she felt she no longer fitted in there. Her home in the old Turkish sector of Larnaca had been emptied of its Turkish Cypriot population who migrated north following the partition

migrants, one from each group, who have followed different migration paths to Britain. Whether these paths are 'typical' or not, we cannot categorically judge, because of the smallness of the sample and the internal heterogeneity within each of the CTK communities. Interviews with key informants, plus the authors' combined wider knowledge of these three groups and the parts of North London where they have predominantly settled, help to place the case-study narratives within a wider context, however. Our findings are illustrative rather than conclusive, they need corroboration and refinement through further research. This paper is therefore very much a pilot investigation.

Despite the exploratory nature of our analysis, several implications are clear. Migrants follow quite diverse migratory trajectories. Whilst, on the one hand, this is a self-evident truism about virtually any migration flow; on the other it also reflects the growing diversity of migrant types, nationalities, mechanisms and motivations, especially in 'super-diverse' London. Gone, it seems, at least as far as the UK is concerned, are the days when mass recruitment schemes brought more-or-less homogenous migrant flows from abroad. Now, in this post-industrial, globalised and cosmopolitan setting of London, migrant flows have not decreased in scale but have become far more diverse. Family, personal and ethnic-community networks assume greater importance. This diversity and informality pose fundamental challenges for migration policy – both in terms of managing or controlling the flows, and as regards integration and social or community cohesion.

We have shown that the concept of superdiversity functions as a good lead into the discussion of CTK groups because of their diverse make-up, which, as we have emphasised, is often hidden by official data. Hence, our paper demonstrates a concrete example of how, over time, the image of a superdiverse London has come into being, with the arrival of mainland Turks and then Kurds having the effect of adding successive layers to the make-up of

a 'Turkish' or 'Turkish-speaking' population originally made up of a Turkish-Cypriot base. Using the concept of nodal points derived from the wider MIGSYS project of which our small study was part, we have described the journeys of the migrants by breaking them into three distinct phases: before migrating, after, and return vs. settlement. It is clear, however, that these phases are interlinked in a more complex way than a simple linear or chronological account would lead us to believe. Above all, the migrants we interviewed still found the process of settling in the UK an unfinished journey. In Baran's case, the reason for this was very much related to UK asylum policy and the fact that he remains without a secure and permanent residence status; his 'humanitarian protection' status does not remove the risk that he could be deported back to Turkey at any time. There was also doubt expressed by Hulya as to whether her visa would be extended. As for Lale, whilst she does have a secure status and considers herself assimilated into Britain, the niggling sense of not fully belonging remains: at various points in her interview she referred to being marked out by her black hair and olive skin colour, her accent and the mistakes she still makes when speaking English.

Regarding policy nodes, we identified two levels of migration-related policy which have impinged on the trajectories of CTK migrants. At the

level, we referred to Britain's early immigration regime which gave privileged entry rights to (former) colonial subjects from Cyprus (and elsewhere); the EU-Turkey Ankara accord, which facilitated Turkish business migration to the UK; and the toughening rules on asylum since the late 1990s, which have reduced asylum applicants from Turkey (who have been mainly Kurds) from nearly 4,000 in 2000 to around 750 in 2005. The effects of national policy are often most acutely felt at

, where policy is implemented directly to migrants. The following key local policy issues can be identified as particularly relating to the CTK communities.

- The way the recent social cohesion policy agenda has coincided with cuts in funding for English-language support for asylum-seekers, alongside the increased level of bureaucratic literacy required to access strategic funding. This is especially problematic and harmful for the most socially disadvantaged groups of immigrants and asylum-seekers, which include CTK migrants.

- The relationship between restrictive asylum measures, the deskilling of migrants and their employment in low-wage jobs in the UK economy. Deskilling, combined with gendered and ethnicised barriers to certain kinds of employment, are characteristics of many migrations, but the asylum rules are particularly prohibitive and problematic, in our view.

- The way that the ethno-national struggle between the Turkish state and the Kurds is played out at the local political and institutional level in the UK, e.g. in the competition for resources between Turkish and Kurdish groups, the use of the term 'Turkish-speaking' to cover also Kurds, and the lobbying of Turkish authorities by certain British politicians.

- The failure of local authorities to identify Kurds separately from Turks, and the reluctance of Kurdish people to register themselves as such, makes it difficult for policy-makers to assess their numbers and plan service provision accordingly.

- A cluster of policy issues surrounding CTK youth: their general educational underachievement; their confused or 'lost' identities; the closure of youth centres and the consequent impact of this on the increase in anti-social behaviour, criminal activities and the formation of Turkish and Kurdish gangs.

All of these are vital nodes, and there are several parallels to be noted, both with other immigrant groups in Britain, and elsewhere in Europe.¹⁶ The last on the list

seems most urgent, for it will be crucial for the future of the Turkish-Cypriot-Kurdish elements of 'super-diverse' London.

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¹⁶ For instance, the problematic identification and registration of Kurds from Turkey as a distinct group from other Turks is characteristic also of Germany (Wahlbeck 1999). Explicit comparison between our findings for

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